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Ricci V. DESTEFANO: LOST AT THE INTERSECTION
CHERYL I. HARRISt
ABSTRACT
The contestation over the Ricci decision largely framed the question
as whether New Haven's action, cancelling the promotional lists for the
fire department, was justified by the desire to avoid disparate impact
liability or was an improper form of discrimination against whites. While
critics cited evidence of racial disparity in the supervisory ranks as legit-
imate grounds for the city's decision, supporters rejected the relevance of
these claims, with both sides largely focused on patterns of underrepre-
sentation of Black and Latino men. However, this analysis rendered in-
visible the interlocking systems of race and gender discrimination that
worked to almost totally exclude women of color from the New Haven
Fire Department, producing patterns even more acutely disparate. This
omission not only overlooked the rights claims of women of color: The
failure to excavate the intersectional impact of the city's employment
practices in Ricci functioned to undermine and discipline anti-racist ad-
vocacy and organizing.
While women of color were invisible in public discourse over Ricci
in one respect, in the context of the debate over the nomination of Justice
Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, the Ricci case became a platform
through which race and gender were rendered highly salient. Her identity
as a Latina and her role in the federal appeals court ruling against the
Ricci plaintiffs before consideration by the Supreme Court, were mobi-
lized to authorize a charge of anti-white bias. During the nomination
hearings, this racial narrative was inadequately contested, as there was
virtually no interrogation of the presumed affiliation between white ra-
cial identity and racial neutrality on one hand, and non-white racial iden-
tity and racial bias on the other. While ultimately Justice Sotomayor's
appointment was confirmed, the "lesson" the public debate conveyed
may be less about majoritarian power and more about the imperatives of
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colorblindness and its role in naturalizing whiteness as a form of institu-
tional racial privilege. Resisting this metric required an intersectional
analysis of the ways in which racialized and gendered systems of power
interact to enact and exploit particular vulnerabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Ricci v. DeStefanol is a case that touched a racial nerve, generating
heated debates about merit, fairness, and racial disparities. Doctrinally,
the decision left ambiguous the rules pertaining to disparate impact as a
category of antidiscrimination claims predicated on evidence of disparate
effects, as distinct from disparate treatment claims that rely on proof of
intentional conduct.2 By a five-vote majority, the Supreme Court ruled
that New Haven's decision to cancel fire department promotions because
its evaluation process excluded virtually all the Black and Latino candi-
dates intentionally discriminated against whites who were in line for
promotion.3 Notwithstanding the city's argument that it acted to avoid
incurring disparate impact liability,4 the Court found that the city's reli-
ance on the racially disparate outcomes of the selection process as the
reason for voiding the promotional lists amounted to an impermissible
1. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
2. Title VII proscribes the use of formally neutral criteria and selection devices that produce
significant adverse impact on protected groups, unless the employer can demonstrate that they are
job related and required by business necessity and that there are no available less discriminatory
alternatives. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A) (2012). This differs from the disparate treatment
cause of action, which requires proof of intentional discrimination. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
3. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561-63.
4. Id. at 579.
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racial consideration.5 In effect, the city's efforts to comply with Title
VII's disparate impact provisions were treated as evidence that it violated
Title VII's disparate treatment proscriptions. The decision not only failed
to resolve questions regarding the relationship between disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact under Title VII, 6 it also introduced uncertainty
about the scope and vitality of disparate impact theory itself.7 An ava-
lanche of commentary and analysis ensued seeking to parse Ricci's doc-
trinal and political implications.
8
Yet, despite that voluminous exegesis, there are important aspects
of Ricci that largely have been underexamined. The Ricci case was con-
structed as a debate over whether the disproportionate exclusion of Black
and Latino men from supervisory jobs based on the outcome of the fire
department's selection processes warranted the city's cancellation of the
5. Id. at 592.
6. Kennedy's majority opinion held that the city's cancellation of the test and the promotion-
al lists constituted illegal intentional discrimination-disparate treatment-against the Ricci plain-
tiffs because "the City made its employment decision because of race" and had not established a
lawful justification for its action, as its apprehension that it would be subject to disparate impact
liability had not been established by a "strong basis in evidence." Id. at 579-80, 592. This standard
was adopted purportedly to resolve the "statutory conflict" between Title VII's disparate treatment
and disparate impact provisions, but the quantum of evidence required for an employer to meet a
"strong basis" remained unclear. Id. at 583; see, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon,
Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 101-02
(2010) (noting the uncertainty surrounding how an employer could accomplish voluntary compli-
ance with Title VII disparate impact law). Moreover, the decision was particularly confounding
because even though it held that the city could defend against any future disparate treatment claims
like Ricci's if it could show a strong basis in evidence that it would be held liable for disparate
impact, the ruling for Ricci on summary judgment simultaneously ignored the evidence presented by
the city, and took for granted that no different arguments could have been made by minority fire-
fighters who might have sued for disparate impact. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592-93; see also Mark S.
Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of White Privilege, 20
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 183-88 (2011) (listing the issues with the Court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in Ricci). Thus, commentators have noted that the decision introduces considerable
doctrinal uncertainty. See, e.g., Harris & West-Faulcon, supra, at 101-02; Richard Primus, The
Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344-45 (2010) (articulating three different
possible readings of the Ricci standard and explaining how the future of the disparate impact doc-
trine hangs on which reading is chosen, as well as the manner in which a future case is presented to
the court); Nancy L. Zisk, Failing the Test: How Ricci v. DeStefano Failed to Clarify Disparate
Impact and Disparate Treatment Law, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 27, 34-46, 49-50 (2011) (analyzing the
difference between the McDonnell Douglas/Griggs standards and the standard set forth in Ricci and
arguing that the Ricci standard is both unclear and highly problematic).
7. Scalia's concurring opinion did so directly by asserting that Title VII's disparate impact
and disparate treatment provisions were or would soon be at "war." Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595-96 (Scal-
ia, J., concurring). The majority opinion did so by asserting that the provisions were "in conflict." Id.
at 580 (majority opinion).
8. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court Employment Discrim-
ination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 587-88 (2010) (laying out the problems that could arise
in various employment discrimination contexts); Ian Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1779, 1874 (2012) (arguing that Ricci is in effect requiring public actors and employers to
"blind themselves to persistent racial discrimination"); Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate
Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2165 n.39 (2013) (citing several articles criticizing the Ricci
standard); Michael K. Grimaldi, Note, Disparate Impact After Ricci and Lewis, 14 SCHOLAR 165,
179 (2011) (arguing that Ricci created a catch-22 in employment testing); see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text. Joined by a co-author, Kimberly West-Faulcon, I was among those contributing
to the debate. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 101-02.
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promotional lists, or whether the city's actions constituted disparate
treatment of white candidates on the basis of race.9 Necessarily, the
Court's affirmation of Ricci's claim entailed the construction of a racial
narrative that legitimated and endorsed as fair practices that exclude
Blacks and Latinos, notwithstanding less discriminatory and more accu-
rate screening mechanisms.'0 The dispute over the Court's reading of
disparate impact doctrine and its relation to disparate treatment was em-
bedded in a contentious discourse over whether disparate impact, like
affirmative action, offended principles of colorblindness and undermined
merit, or whether attention to racially exclusionary effects is necessary to
combat the "built-in headwinds" of structural inequality.1
However, the terms of this debate rendered invisible the position of
women of color and the interlocking systems of race and gender discrim-
ination that worked to exclude them nearly entirely from the New Haven
Fire Department. Instead, those defending and those challenging the
city's decision focused on the relative position of men of different races
in the fire department's supervisory ranks. While the exclusionary "effect
of the city's selection practices constituted ample evidence of a disparate
impact claim,'2 and indeed, after Ricci, that precise case was brought by
minority firefighters,'3 the underrepresentation of women generally and
of women of color in particular was stark.'4 This gross disparity was not
9. There is at least one noteworthy exception. Ann C. McGinley's article is an extensive
exploration of the gendered dimensions of the case and the construction of firefighting work through
masculinity. See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 581,584-85 (2010).
10. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592.
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). This debate implicated competing
understandings of the asserted racial neutrality of the selection process and the broader racial con-
text, a matter that I have critiqued elsewhere. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 109.
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits plaintiffs to sue employers who discrim-
inate against them on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The statute obviously
applies to employers who intentionally discriminate, but the courts (and later the statute itself) also
give plaintiffs standing to sue if the employer has caused classes of people to be treated differently
even if the employer was using facially neutral employment policies. To prove disparate impact, a
plaintiff must show that "an employment practice or policy has a disproportionately adverse effect
on members of the protected class as compared with nonmembers of the protected class." EEOC v.
Sambo's of Ga. Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 92 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
13. In Tinney v. City of New Haven, seven African-American firefighters in New Haven who
took the same exams at issue in Ricci, set forth four claims against the city and the Union for equal
protection, due process, and Title VII claims for disparate treatment and disparate impact. Tinney v.
City of New Haven, No. 3:11-cv-1546 (SRU), 2014 WL 1315653, at *6-7 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2014). Briscoe was an intervenor plaintiff. In Briscoe, an African-American firefighter in New
Haven who took the same exam at issue in Ricci, claimed that the city violated the disparate impact
provision in Title VII by weighting the written portion higher than the oral portion of the exam.
Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212, at *3 (D. Conn. July 12,
2010), decision clarified on reconsideration, 3:09-cv-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794231 (D. Conn.
July 12, 2010), vacated, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011).
14. Only II out of the 411 New Haven firefighters were women. Nicole Allen & Emily
Bazelon, The Ladder. Part 2: Do White, Black, and Hispanic Firefighters in New Haven Get
Along?, SLATE (June 25, 2009, 7:17 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/features/2009/the- ladder/part 2_do_
white blackand hispanicfirefighters in new havengetalong.htm. Of those, four were women
of color. McGinley, supra note 9, at 591.
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the result of "natural" preferences: It was produced by selection process-
es grounded in gendered and racialized presumptions that constructed
firefighting as (white) men's work.'5 Women, and women of color in
particular, have been excluded from firefighting for decades,'6 but this
broader context of entrenched racial and sex based inequality was largely
erased in the legal analysis and public debate. To identify the problems
with the debate implicated in Ricci I draw on Kimberl6 Crenshaw's cri-
tique of traditional antidiscrimination analysis that conceptualizes dis-
crimination along a single axis, such as race or gender, and fails to attend
to the intersectional and interactive nature of discrimination across mul-
tiple categories.17 In Ricci, race was at the core of the case but that did
not make gender irrelevant-indeed, including the experience of Black
women was central to exposing the exclusionary impact and invalidity of
the selection process. Unfortunately, the failure to excavate the intersec-
tional effects of the city's employment and promotional practices in Ricci
functioned to undermine the strength of minority candidates' antidiscrim-
ination claims and to discipline antiracist advocacy and organizing by
narrowing the way issues were framed.
On the other hand, while the legal and popular debate over the Ricci
case lacked any meaningful attention to its gendered implications, those
dimensions became highly salient during the debate over the nomination
of Justice Sonia Sotomayor as the first woman of color and first Latina/o
to serve on the United States Supreme Court.18 Her public affirmation of
her identity as a Latina and her decision against the Ricci plaintiffs, ren-
dered while she served on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, were
mobilized in support of the charge that she was racially biased against
whites.'9 Sotomayor's racial and gender identity and her self-aware sub-
jectivity denied her the presumption of judicial objectivity accorded to
whites. Notably, this presumption obtained even against the background
of past and ongoing practices that favored white candidates and had con-
structed the judiciary as a white male institution for decades.20 While the
Democratic majority in the Senate made it likely that Sotomayor would
be confirmed, the opposition was successful in framing the debate on her
nomination around the presumed affiliation between white racial identity
and racial neutrality on the one hand, and non-white racial identity and
racial bias on the other.2' Left virtually uncontested, these presupposi-
tions reconfigured even a moderate Justice like Sotomayor into a reverse
15. See infra Part 1.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139-40.
18. See infra Part 11.
19. See infra Part 11.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. At the time of Justice Sotomayor's nomination, Democrats comprised a majority of the
US Senate. See infra Part 11 (discussion of the nomination).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
racist and severely circumscribed the terms upon which racial reform and
antidiscrimination law could be defended.
These constraints had implications beyond the Sotomayor nomina-
tion: While presidential nominees to judicial and cabinet positions with
civil rights affiliations have suffered delays and derailments because of
the entrenched political struggle between the President and his political
opponents, a central narrative of that opposition defines those affiliations
as compelling evidence of pro-minority and anti-white bias.22 In this
sense, Sotomayor's confirmation is less an illustration of majoritarian
power and is more demonstrative of the imperatives of colorblindness as
a legitimate litmus test of objectivity and judicial temperament and a
presumed characteristic of whites. Defending Sotomayor did not require
portraying her as "less Latina" but rather challenging the assumption that
whiteness constitutes a race-neutral baseline against which people of
color are legitimately adjudged to be wanting. An intersectional analysis
of racial and gendered power illuminates how these presumptions are
produced and how particular (racialized) identities are constructed as
inherently biased. This would have facilitated the refraining of the debate
over Sotomayor's nomination so as to interrogate the racial presumptions
that align whiteness with objectivity and non-whites with bias. Engaging
this argument was important to Sotomayor's confirmation and to secur-
ing political space for future nominees of color as well as those whose
commitments have aligned with seeking racial justice.
23
I argue that the invisibility of discrimination against women of color
in the public and legal debate over Ricci and the deployment of Ricci as
evidence of the purported threat that Justice Sotomayor posed to judicial
objectivity are symptomatic of the limitations of current racial frame-
works. These constraints also affect dimensions of antiracist and antidis-
crimination advocacy. At one level, both these aspects of Ricci illustrate
why intersectional analysis must be summoned: Exposing systems of
racial and gender power is critical to addressing inequality in all its myri-
ad forms.
In Part I, I map Ricci's invisible intersections, examining the condi-
tions of women of color in the New Haven Fire Department. I situate the
condition of women of color in the context of broader patterns of severe
underrepresentation of women of color in fire departments nationally. I
note particularly how the traditional selection practices of urban fire de-
22. See infra Part 11.
23. See Joel Marrero-Otero, Comment, What Does a Wise Latina Look Like? An Intersection-
al Analysis of Sonia Sotomayor's Confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O
L. REV. 177, 197-99 (2011); Kimberld Crenshaw, In Her Judgment, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2014, at
BR17 (reviewing JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE (2014)); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Op-Ed., A Failed Conversation-GOP Assertions to
the Contrary, The Sotomayor Hearings Shed Little Light on Either Race or Justice, BALT. SUN, July
23, 2009, at 17A.
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partments, like those in New York and Los Angeles, work to produce
racialized and gendered exclusion. Deploying an intersectional analysis, I
illustrate how the marginalization of the experiences of women of color
in opposition to that exclusion conspires to effectively isolate their rights
claims and enacts a constrained form of antiracist and feminist politics.
This disaggregation is inherent in the structure of antidiscrimination law
and is reproduced in legal and political advocacy that ignores the rela-
24
tionship between racial and gender exclusion.
Part II examines how the Ricci case figured in the debate over the
nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme
Court. Unlike the invisibility of race and gender intersections in the de-
bate over the case, the hearings on the Sotomayor nomination rendered
race and gender highly visible in service of the charge of racial discrimi-
nation against whites. While initially Sotomayor's nomination was cele-
brated, particularly among Latino communities, she was soon subjected
to the criticism that she held racial animus against whites.25 The Supreme
Court's reversal of her decision in Ricci became evidence of this alleged
bias. In this sense Sotomayor's identity as a Latina, together with her
decision in Ricci, facilitated the invocation of racialist tropes that equated
non-white racial identity and civil rights advocacy with racism against
whites.26
I conclude by considering how the debate over Ricci both as a legal
dispute and its symbolic meaning in the nomination of Sotomayor illu-
minates some of the costs of omitting an intersectional analysis. The
erasure of women of color as legitimate stakeholders in the debate over
equal opportunity undermined the ability to challenge the presumptions
24. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 141-50; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 708-719 (2001); Judith A. Winston, Mir-
ror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 796-801 (1991); Peggie R. Smith, Comment, Sepa-
rate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 21-25 (1991).
25. Peter Baker, Court Choice Pushes Issue of 'Identity Politics' Back to Forefront, N. Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2009, at A20 ("Critics took issue with her past statements and called her a 'reverse
racist."'); Tom Goldstein, Op-Ed., Her Justice is Blind, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A21 ("Some
infer from [Sotomayor's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano] that Judge Sotomayor must be biased
against whites."); Ifill, supra note 23, at 17A ("[Ricci] involved the inflammatory issue of race...
[a]nd so, ignoring thousands of decisions in which Judge Sotomayor has participated, they undertook
to paint the nominee as a dangerous racial partisan."); Ruben Navarrette Jr., Op-Ed, Latina Had to
Calm Whites' Racial Fears - Watching Sotomayor, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky), July 19,
2009, at D4 ("Republicans have two basic objections to Sotomayor - That she'll make decisions
based on 'empathy,' and that those decisions will reveal what Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell described recently as a racial bias."); Chuck Raasch, Op-Ed., A Different View on Judi-
cial Activism, USA TODAY (July 1, 2009, 1:49 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/raasch/2009-07-01 -raasch-column-
07012009 N.htm ("After the Ricci decision was announced, a coalition of right-leaning lawyers and
activists ... [said] that the decision 'calls into question whether Sotomayor is capable of treating all
Americans fairly and equally."'); Peter Wallsten, Republican Senators Alter Course on Nominee,
L. A. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A 10 ("Republican senators ... have lashed out at conservatives in their
party who branded the would-be justice a racist .... ").
26. See infra Part ILA.
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of colorblindness that legitimated racially exclusionary practices as fair
and affirmed a presumed affiliation between whiteness and neutrality and
objectivity. This omission obscured crucial legal and political terrain,
hampered coalitional possibilities, and diluted the power of civil rights
claims.
I. INVISIBLE INTERSECTIONS
In this Part I review the facts of the Ricci case. Drawing on Kimber-
16 Crenshaw's theoretical framework of intersectionality,27 I consider the
employment record of the New Haven Fire Department in the broader
context of widespread patterns of gender and racial exclusion in fire de-
partments nationally. New Haven's practices, while facially neutral, sys-
tematically excluded women and minorities.28 Like other fire depart-
ments, New Haven's procedures had been successfully challenged under
Title VII's disparate impact framework.2 9 Historically, the experience of
women and women of color was central to efforts to strengthen disparate
impact law in the 1991 Civil Rights Act after the Supreme Court had
weakened it. 30 Thus the erasure of women of color from the public de-
bate over Ricci was deeply ironic. More significantly, the failure to in-
clude the experience of women of color occluded their lived experience
and removed from antidiscrimination advocacy evidence that supported
the city's decision to reject the results of the department's exclusionary
selection procedures. An intersectional analysis would have illustrated
why the disparate impact claim was legally viable and thus justified the
city's rejection of the promotional lists. Not only did the selection proce-
27. See Crenshaw, supra note 17.
28. See infra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
30. The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), held that in proving disparate
impact liability plaintiffs were required to establish racial disparity in hiring pattems with greater
specificity and that the disparities were the result of specific hiring practices of the employer. The
employer's rebuttal burden was also reduced from a burden of persuasion to a burden of production
and from demonstrating job-relatedness and business necessity o "a reasoned review of the employ-
er's justification." Id. at 659. This case was widely viewed as dramatically increasing the burden of
proof on plaintiffs in discrimination cases and undermining the ability of plaintiffs to secure relief.
See Michael K. Braswell, Gary A. Moore & Bill Shaw, Disparate Impact Theory in the Aftermath of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: Burdens of Proof Statistical Evidence, and Affirmative Action,
54 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1989); John Shavers, Jr., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: A Departure
From the Intent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 17 S.U. L. REV. 133, 145-47 (1990).
Congress responded to Wards Cove and other decisions weakening civil rights laws by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Peter M. Leibold, Stephen A. Sola & Reginald E. Jones, Civil Rights
Act of 1991: Race to the Finish-Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1043, 1083-84 (1993). Hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 included and relied heavily
on the testimony from women and minority firefighters who recounted discriminatory practices that
continued well after the enactment of the 1972 amendments. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the H.R. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 102d Cong. 379-87 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Civil Rights Act Hearings] (reporting the testimony of Brenda Berkman, President of the United
Women Firefighters, regarding the history of litigation against the New York fire department for the
use of criteria that unnecessarily screened out qualified women candidates and her subsequent ermi-
nation in retaliation for playing a role in the lawsuit).
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dures negatively impact Black and Latino males on the New Haven Fire
Department, women and women of color were severely affected as
well.31 This analysis was crucial to making the case that the underrepre-
sentation of minorities and women was symptomatic of discrimination
and not simply the product of natural distribution or individual prefer-
ences.
A. Intersectionality: Exposing the Interactive Mechanisms of Exclusion
The erasure of the experience of women of color from legal and po-
litical narratives of discrimination is related to, and is in part a product
of, the limitations of antidiscrimination law and discourse. Kimberl6
Crenshaw's work has critiqued the ways in which the framework of anti-
discrimination law and politics has depended upon a conception of rac-
ism and sexism that marginalizes Black women. In Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimi-
nation Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Policies, she pointed
out that courts disallowed the employment discrimination claims of
Black women as Black women and further disallowed Black women
from serving as class representatives in suits involving race or sex dis-
crimination.32 Both traditional legal frameworks and organizational poli-
tics tended to be based on narratives that disaggregated race and gender
identities and experiences.33 Thus, not only were Black women's specific
injuries invisible within the given structure of antidiscrimination law,
but they were deemed unable to represent women in sex discrimination
claims or to represent Blacks in race discrimination claims- they were
different from how difference had been doctrinally categorized-.
precisely because their experience could not be marked along a single
axis.34 This not only obscured the experience of women of color but the
interactive and interlocking nature of forms of oppression as well.
Crenshaw's move to bring the politics of Black feminism into law
was a crucial part of Critical Race Theory's challenge to limited concep-
31. See infra notes 53-60.
32. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 141-50 (describing case law in which Black women's
charges of employment discrimination were rejected).
33. See id at 150.
34. See id at 148-49. As Crenshaw put it:
Black women were harmed both by being treated as though they were the same and by
being treated as though they were different. There was no simple, once and for all, solu-
tion because the nature of the discrimination faced by these Black female plaintiffs was
not a simple, once and for all, event. Indeed, as the cases revealed, there were numerous
ways that Black female plaintiffs experienced discrimination; the point of the intersec-
tional metaphor was to draw attention to the multiple ways that patterns of power can
converge. Its corollary was to argue both against the elision of difference where it makes
a difference, and against fetishizing difference where it does not.
Kimberl W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and
Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151, 165 (2010).
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tions of antidiscrimination law itself.35 Intersectionality constituted a way
to describe how Black women were positioned-or more specifically,
marginalized-under Title VII, not as a way of marking particularity for
its own sake, but as a predicate to addressing a set of conditions that ren-
dered multiple social groups vulnerable to subordination. Dismantling
these interlocking forms of subordination required a fundamental chal-
lenge to prevailing legal and political conceptions of discrimination.
Broadly put, the dominant paradigm of antidiscrimination law defined
discrimination as race- or sex-based departures from otherwise neutral
baselines and processes.36 This bias-focused model ignored, and largely
obscured, the way that racism and patriarchy worked in tandem to ex-
clude women of color and to embed and normalize white and male privi-
lege in social practices, interactions, and institutions.37 While disparate
impact doctrine did attend to precisely those neutral factors that consti-
tuted and constructed significant headwinds, the prevailing framework
privileged a single axis, bias-based approach. As Crenshaw put it, this
model was decidedly deficient:
This process-based definition is not grounded in a bottom-up
commitment to improve the substantive conditions for those
who are victimized by the interplay of numerous factors. In-
stead, the dominant message of antidiscrimination law is that it
will regulate only the limited extent to which race or sex inter-
feres with the process of determining outcomes. This narrow
objective is facilitated by the top-down strategy of using a sin-
gular "but for" analysis to ascertain the effects of race or sex.
Because the scope of antidiscrimination law is so limited, sex
and race discrimination have come to be defined in terms of
the experiences of those who are privileged but for their racial
or sexual characteristics. Put differently, the paradigm of sex
discrimination tends to be based on the experiences of white
women; the model of race discrimination tends to be based on
the experiences of the most privileged Blacks.
38
Intersectionality then identified the deficiencies of the traditional
model not only to critique the erasure of Black women's experience in
35. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 140, 154, 162 (referencing Black feminism as a challenge
to racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, and economic inequality). This was part of the broader
Critical Race Theory project, which in contrast to traditional models that conceived of race as a
phenomenon entirely external to law, saw law and legal doctrine as an ideological narrative about
what race and racism are. In constructing racism as aberrational, individual and intentionally driven,
antidiscrimination law and models were inherently limited and flawed, and failed to consider the
endemic, structural, and automatic nature of racial subordination. See Introduction to CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii-xxxii (Kimberld Cren-
shaw et al. eds., 1995).
36. Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 15 1.
37. Id. at 152.
38. Id. at 151.
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antidiscrimination law, but to expose the inadequacy of the traditional
antidiscrimination paradigm in addressing subordination. Notably, these
deficiencies were not confined to law: Antiracist and feminist politics
reproduced the "but for" logic inherent in antidiscrimination law defining
discrimination as a deviation from an otherwise neutral norm on the basis
39
of some singular characteristic, with often devastating consequences.
Thus, women of color were not seen as authentic representatives of an
antiracist agenda, nor were their concerns legible within feminist politics.
Thus, when minority firefighters and their advocates failed to in-
clude the experiences of women of color as part of their response to the
Ricci case, the claim that the fire department's practices constituted dis-
criminatory conduct under Title VII's disparate impact provisions was
weakened. Focusing on the experiences of women of color not only
would have illuminated the exclusionary nature of the city's promotional
policies, it would have created the conditions of possibility for a broader
and more robust coalitional effort among women of all races and men of
color to respond to the litigation. I am not arguing that a more inclusive
narrative about the impact of the department's practices would have
changed the outcome of the case. Instead, I posit simply that a different
framework would have helped contest the presumption that the test com-
ponents, test weighting and ranking were all neutral, fair, and necessary,
which was how the case was cast in the public debate.
B. Ricci-The Missing Data and Analysis
The New Haven Fire Department, like most urban fire departments,
had a long history of racial exclusion.40 After years of litigation and or-
ganizing, the number of minority firefighters began to increase, but the
supervisory positions remained predominately white.41 Thus, at the time
of the Ricci litigation, Blacks were 32% of the entry-level positions in
the New Haven Fire Department but only about 9% of the supervisory
42 4positions. Latinos were 16% of entry-level positions43 and about 9% of
39. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropria-
tions of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 416-417 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992) (describing how in the debate over the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court,
the sexual harassment of Anita Hill was reconfigured as a "high-tech lynching," effectively allowing
him to garner greater support as a victim of racial discrimination, erase Anita Hill as a Black woman,
and secure his appointment (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kimberld Crenshaw, Map-
ping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1990) (describing how feminist antiviolence campaigns and organizing often
fail to consider the position of women of color).
40. See Firebird Soc'y v. Members of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 556 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Black firemen suing New Haven for discriminatory practices in hiring and promotions); Brantley v.
City of New Haven, 364 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005) (Black plaintiff suing New Haven for
discriminatory firing); New Haven Firebird Soc'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of New Haven, 593 A.2d
1383 (Conn. 1991) (plaintiffs suing New Haven for discriminatory promotion practices).
41. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 610-11 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
42. A brief filed in support of the Respondents tated:
Of thirty-two officers at the level of captain or higher, there were just three African
Americans and three Hispanics in 2005.
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the supervisory positions.44 These imbalances were the result of prior
selection procedures for supervisory positions that had been held legally
invalid. In 1973, the Firebirds sued the city for a pattern of willful dis-
crimination in hiring and promotion.45 The suit ended in a consent decree
that improved entry-level hiring, but the upper ranks remained mostly
white.46 In two subsequent cases, minorities successfully challenged the
department's promotional policies as violative of civil service procedures
as well.47
When the city sought to fill fifteen vacant supervisory positions, it
hired a professional test developer who constructed two written tests that
were administered to 118 applicants.48 Additionally, all candidates were
given an oral exam, and after both components were scored, the tests
were weighted-60% for the written portion and 40% for the oral por-
tion-pursuant to the union contract, and a composite score was record-
ed.49 While there were Black candidates who had higher written or oral
scores than some white candidates, the weighting produced a list in
which no Black and only two Latino candidates would be eligible for
promotion.50 The city's concern was that given the test's extreme impact,
... According to New Haven's ... EEO-4 data, in 2007, African Americans held 32% of
entry-level positions in the fire department, but only 15% of supervisory positions.
Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 17, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) (footnote omitted); see also
Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
43. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated:
As of 2003, African-Americans and Hispanics constituted 30 percent and 16 percent of
the City's firefighters, respectively. In supervisory positions, however, significant dis-
parities remain. Overall, the senior officer ranks (captain and higher) are nine percent Af-
rican-American and nine percent Hispanic. Only one of the Department's 21 fire captains
is African-American.
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 610-11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. Id. A few years later, in 2009, Slate reported that, "[o]ut of 411 firefighters in the city,
only 50 are Hispanic-12 percent, in a city where there are twice as many Hispanics." Allen &
Bazelon, supra note 14.
45. Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457
(D. Conn. 1975), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975). The Firebird Society of New Haven is an
organization of Black and Hispanic firefighters. It was started in 1971 and was instrumental during
the 1970s in the litigation that resulted in the New Haven Fire Department changing its hiring poli-
cies to increase the number of minority firefighters. They are a member of the International Associa-
tion of Black Professional Firefighters, and their current membership is about sixty firefighters. See
History of The Firebird Society of New Haven, NEW HAVEN FIREBIRDS,
http://www.newhavenfirebirds.com/the-firebird-society-of-new-haven-inorporated-history.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2014); see also Active Members, NEW HAVEN FIREBIRDS,
http://www.newhavenfirebirds.com/active-members.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
46. Id. at 463.
47. See Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 851 A.2d 1113, 1136 (Conn. 2004) (finding that the
practice of using lower ranked white officers to fill positions budgeted for higher rank was unfairly
increasing the number of whites placed into the candidate pool for promotions in violation of civil
service rules); New Haven Firebird Soc'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of New Haven, 593 A.2d 1383
(Conn. 1991) (holding that disproportionate promotion of whites to positions not yet vacant was
violative of civil service rules).
48. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562-66.
49. Id. at 564.
50. Id. at 589.
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and that neither the content nor the scoring process could be justified as
valid measures of job-related merit, minority candidates would challenge
the selection process as racially exclusionary and not warranted by busi-
ness necessity.51 The worry was particularly acute because the city,
through its lawyer, was aware that other municipalities had used different
assessment procedures that produced more racially diverse results.
52
The case that the city's practices produced impermissible disparate
impact rested entirely on the underrepresentation of Black and Latino
men in the supervisory ranks: The even more severe underrepresentation
of women of color, both in the fire department as a whole and in the su-
pervisory ranks, was invisible. Out of the 411 firefighters employed by
the city at the time only eleven were women, and of those, seven were
white, four were Black.53 There were no Latinas. None of the three wom-
en who took the promotional exams in 2003 qualified for advancement:
Two failed the lieutenant's exam, and the one who took the captain's
exam passed but was not promoted based on where she fell in the rank-
ings.54 This fact was overlooked in the vast majority of news articles on
the case.55 One notable exception was part of a multi-part series pub-
lished in Slate in which the reporter interviewed Erika Bogan, a Black
woman firefighter and one of the leaders of the Firebirds, the local
branch of the international Black firefighters association.56 Bogan was
outspoken about the way that race mattered in the New Haven Fire De-
partment, noting that race was highly correlated with place of residence:
Many white firefighters resided outside of New Haven in virtually all-
57white suburbs, while Black firefighters tended to live in New Haven, a
majority non-white city.58 Bogan contended that as a result white fire-
fighters related very differently to the neighborhoods they were assigned
to protect:
Bogan says that when black kids peek into the Howard Ave-
nue firehouse, oohing at the trucks, she and her fellow black
51. Id. at 563.
52. Id. at 572-73.
53. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 591 & n.79 (citing chart provided by Victor Bolden,
Corporation Counsel for City of New Haven); Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14 ("There is only one
woman on the Howard Avenue shift with Neal and Heins. Erika Bogan, who is black, is one of I 1
female firefighters in the entire city. (That's a whole different subject.)").
54. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 590-91.
55. See id. at 616-18 (noting the absence of women's stories and testimony about the case).
56. Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
57. Id.
58. New Haven's population is over 50% Black and Latino. New Haven (city), Connecticut,
QuickFacts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/09/0952000.html (last updated Jul. 8, 2014). The city was
also over 50% Black and Latino in 2003 when the dispute in Ricci arose. See New Haven. Connecti-
cut Population. Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, Demographics, Statistics, Quick Facts,
CENSUSVIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/city/CT/New/20Haven (last visited Oct. 25, 2014)
(showing that in 2000, the census reported that the Black population of New Haven was 37% and the
Latino population was 21%).
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firefighters like Mike Neal scoop them up and take them in-
side. But the suburban white guys, she says, ignore the kids.
She said she has also heard them joke on the phone about
"working in the ghetto." "How dare you, when you live in
Madison or Guilford, come in here and take our money and go
back to your communities and talk shit about New Haven?"
she asked.59
Like many municipal fire departments, the number of women
(2.6%) and women of color (0.9%) on the New Haven Fire Department
approached "the inexorable zero."60 Indeed, these numbers were substan-
tially lower than the number of women or women of color in the relevant
labor market-the number of a group qualified and available to perform
a specific job in a particular area.61 According to a national study done in
2008, the expected female representation in firefighting jobs is 17%; the
number for women of color is 5.9%.62 As of 2012, only 3.4% of fire-
fighters are women and only 0.8% of firefighters are women of color.
63
Critics of these disparity analyses have contended that low numbers
simply reflect women's disinterest in firefighter jobs. However, the re-
port points out that the utilization analysis includes adequate controls for
interest: These figures are derived from counting the number of women
in the relevant age group with a high school diploma in the labor market,
and of that number, examining the proportion of women who perform
physically demanding or "dirty" jobs, such as welders, construction
workers, and the like.64 Because women make up about 17% of these
comparable jobs, a reasonable expectation is that they would be a similar
proportion of the firefighting workforce as well. 65 The fact that New Ha-
59. Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
60. See id.; see also McGinley, supra note 9, at 591 (citing chart provided by Victor Bolden,
Corporation Counsel for City of New Haven). The term "inexorable zero" is from Teamsters, in
which the court ruled that the severe underrepresentation-the inexorable zero- created a presump-
tion of discrimination. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir. 1975), vacat-
edsub nom., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
61. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977).
62. DENISE M. HULETT ET AL., A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON WOMEN IN FIREFIGHTING 1-2
(2008), available at http://www.i-women.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/35827WSP.pdf. In 2012,
3.4% of firefighters were women, 7.7% of firefighters were Black, and 9.9% of firefighters were of
Hispanic origin. Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n, Firefighting Occupations by Women and Race, NFPA.ORG,
http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/the-fire-service/administration/firefighting-
occupations-by-women-and-race (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
63. HULETr ET AL., supra note 62, at 2; NPFA supra note 62.
64. The study computed the number "of women in the nation's labor force of typical firefight-
er age (20-49) and educational background (high school graduate but no college degree), working
full time in one of 184" professions, which ad similar strength, stamina, and dexterity requirements
as firefighting does. These "occupations include[d] bus mechanics, drywall installers, enlisted mili-
tary personnel, highway maintenance workers, loggers, professional athletes, refuse collectors,
roofers, septic tank servicers, tire builders, and welders." Id. at 1.
65. Id.
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ven's numbers are so low reflects significant underutilization by both
race and gender. 66
While it is obvious why New Haven might not highlight these stark
gender and race disparities, it is less clear why advocates for minority
firefighters did not make more of this sorry record. Even absent knowing
the precise number of women of color in New Haven's relevant labor
market, there is reason to surmise that the percentage of women of color
employed by the New Haven Fire Department would exceed national
estimates because New Haven's population is and historically has been
predominately non-white.67 That would suggest that the underutilization
is even more profound. While the central issue in the case involved pro-
motions as distinct from hiring, the pattern of underutilization would
have had salience in the case and could have strengthened the argument
that the New Haven Fire Department's selection practices were flawed,
and not fair and neutral as Ricci claimed. Indeed, these numbers consti-
tuted a compelling signal that the procedures violated Title VII's dispar-
ate impact provisions. Marc Bendick, an employment economist and one
of the researchers in a national study, has explained the relationship be-
tween underrepresentation and discrimination:
Research has determined that, in fire departments where wom-
en are given fair, equal, non-hostile treatment in recruitment
[and] training,... it is reasonable to expect a fire department's
uniformed firefighters and officers to include about 17% wom-
en.
. . . When a fire department employs women at a rate much
lower than 17% ... that outcome is directly traceable to a de-
partmental culture in which hostility, discrimination, harass-
ment and exclusion operate and are tolerated, implicitly and
explicitly, by departmental leadership.
68
A discussion of why there were so few women, and women of color spe-
cifically, also would have advanced a more robust and compelling narra-
tive about exclusion and subordination would challenge the dominant
view that the disparate impact claims of minorities and women were
simply a form of seeking preferential treatment.
From the vantage point of the city and advocates for minority fire-
fighters, it was critical to explain why the city cancelled the results of the
selection procedures. The experience of women of color was an im-
66. See id.; see also Allen & Bazelon, supra note 14.
67. See supra note 58 (reporting Census figures).
68. Marc Bendick, Jr., Principal, Bendick & Egan Economic Counsultants, Inc., What Re-
search Tells Us About Women in Firefighting: Testimony before the City Council of N.Y.C. 1-2
(Dec. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.bendickegan.com/pdf/Bendick NY Firefighter-Testimony December 2013.pdf.
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portant part of that explanation. While the dominant narrative was that
the procedures were fair and that the city simply rejected an outcome it
did not like, in fact New Haven's selection processes, like those of many
fire departments, were structured in a way that reproduced gross racial
and gender disparities. Repeated legal challenges demonstrated that
competency was not simply determined by a set of objective criteria
evenly applied, as both physical and written exams had been shown to
include discriminatory and unnecessary metrics.69 Specifically, multiple-
choice tests, like that administered by New Haven, have been critiqued
as an invalid measure of the skills necessary to do the job of captain or
lieutenant, as they fail to identify "leadership skills," "command pres-
ence" skills, and abilities that fire officers must possess.70 Additionally,
the tests were structured around memorization of fire terms and proce-
dures of fire suppression that did not incorporate other aspects of the job
that include emergency medical services, as fire departments have taken
over these tasks, as well as fire safety inspections and investigations.
7'
69. See, e.g., Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1024-25 (1st Cir.
1974) (ruling that the state firefighter's exam, which had an adverse impact on minorities and wom-
en, "was not professionally developed; its content does not appear to be job related; the cutoff score
of 70 is arbitrary; the validation study reveals no correlation to overall measures, either subjective or
objective, and only minimal correlation to two individual objective tasks"); Hayden v. Cnty. of
Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding efforts by the police department to switch
from multiple-choice exams that created substantial underrepresentation of women and minorities to
a new test that was job related and minimized adverse impact on minorities); United States v. City of
New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 238, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013)
(finding that the city's firefighter exam "did not actually test for the job-related abilities they were
intended to test for," "the examinations were written at an unnecessarily high reading level," and
"the chosen cutoff scores for the examinations did not bear any relationship to the necessary job
qualifications"; and further characterizing the city's firefighting policies as "34 years of intransi-
gence and deliberate indifference"); Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 30, at 383-84 (testimony
of Brenda Berkman, President, United Women Firefighters). It is also worth noting "that prior to
1972, most police departments and many fire departments never had a physical performance test as
part of their selection criteria." See Event, Taking the Heat: Gender Discrimination in Firefighting,
17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 713, 717 (2009) (remarks by Professor Richard Ugelow).
70. These skills are critical to the successful performance of the supervisory jobs. See Brief of
Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1I, Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) ("Leadership in emergency-response crises
requires expertise in fire-management techniques and sound judgment about life-and-death deci-
sions .... Simply put, command presence is a hallmark of a successful fire officer. Virtually all
studies of fire management emphasize that command presence is vital to the safety of firefighters at
the scene and to the successful accomplishment of the firefighting mission and the safety of the
public." (citation omitted)). However, written multiple choice tests are not good measures of these
skills. See id. at 15 ("It is well-recognized by 1/0 psychologists and firefighters alike that written,
pencil-and-paper tests, while able to measure certain cognitive abilities (e.g., reading and memoriza-
tion) and factual knowledge, do not measure other skills and abilities critical to being an effective
fire officer as well as alternative methods of testing do.") (citing MICHAEL A. TERPAK, ASSESSMENT
CENTER: STRATEGY AND TACTICS 1 (2008) (asserting that "multiple-choice exams are 'known to be
poor at measuring the knowledge and abilities of the candidate, most notably that of a fire of-
ficer"')). The term "fire officer" is used in contrast to the term "firefighter" to refer to higher-ranking
firefighters with supervisory responsibilities over entry-level firefighters. See id. at 10.
71. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 599-600 (describing the changing nature of firefighters'
jobs to include caretaking tasks that many white males denigrate relative to firefighting); see also
Denise M. Hulett, Marc Bendick, Sheila Y. Thomas & Francine Moccio, Enhancing Women's Inclu-
sion in Firefighting in the USA, 8 INT'L J. DIVERSITY ORG. COMMUNITIES & NATIONS 189, 190
(2008) (noting that nearly two-thirds of fire department calls are for medical assistance and that 65%
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While facially neutral, these evaluation procedures were embedded in
and the product of a set of interlocking presumptions about firefighting
as (white) men's work. Disparate impact theory and doctrine is crucial to
illuminating these presumptions, as it places the burden on Title VII em-
ployers to demonstrate that the tests and procedures they use are actually
"merit-selecting.72
C. Women of Color and Firefighting-National Trends and Recent Ex-
amples
In this Part, I situate New Haven's practices in a broader context.
First, I briefly review the history of the amendment to Title VII in 1991
as a way to illustrate the centrality of the experience of women and
women of color to disparate impact law. I also examine the patterns of
employment of women and women of color in the New Haven Fire De-
partment against national data and trends. Finally, I consider recent dis-
putes over hiring and working conditions for minorities and women in
the New York and Los Angeles fire departments to illuminate the inter-
locking character of racism and sexism in this domain.
1. Historical Role of Women in Disparate Impact Doctrine
The exclusion of women and women of color from the Ricci story
and litigation was a particularly problematic omission given the histori-
cal role of women in firefighting in defending disparate impact doctrine.
Brenda Berkman, one of the handful of female firefighters in the Fire
Department of New York, testified in support of the amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio73 among other decisions in the
1989 term adverse to minority plaintiffs charging discrimination.74 In
Wards Cove the plaintiffs charged both systemic disparate treatment and
disparate impact in connection with Alaskan cannery employment prac-
tices that resulted in a racially skewed workforce in which skilled, higher
paying jobs went to whites, while non-white workers were consigned to
lower paying cannery jobs.75 The Court in Wards Cove ruled against the
plaintiffs because, in the majority's view, the proof did not sufficiently
connect specific employment practices to particular outcomes, effective-
ly raising the standard of proof for disparate impact claims.76
of fire departments have assumed responsibility for emergency ambulance services in their jurisdic-
tion).
72. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1074.
74. Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 30, at 385.
75. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642, 648.
76. Id. at 656-57 (reasoning that just as an employer cannot escape liability by demonstrating
that their workforce is racially balanced, a plaintiff cannot support a disparate impact case simply by
showing that there is racial imbalance-they must demonstrate that a specific employment practice
has a disparate impact on the group in question).
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In her testimony Berkman described the barriers she faced in be-
coming a firefighter. Although over 300 women passed the written test,
only 88 took the physical test because of the rumor that no woman had
ever passed it.77 When Berkman failed the exam, she along with several
other women, challenged the physical test because it produced a dispar-
ate impact on women.78 The test was thrown out because there was no
showing of business necessity-that is no showing of the relationship
between performance on the test and performance on the job.79 Berkman
was finally hired pursuant to a court order, but as she testified, "Once
hired, we were denied the ordinary amenities of cooperative firehouse
living and subjected to daily sexual harassment and hazing. This includ-
ed crude sexual comments, obscene graffiti and physical molestation.
'" 80
Two of the women were terminated.81 Berkman and Zeda Gonzales filed
suit over the retaliation and won.82 This proved to be critical evidence
regarding the importance of the disparate impact framework, demonstrat-
ing why it was necessary to correct the Court's decision in Wards Cove.
As Berkman put it, had she litigated her case under the Wards Cove
standard, she would have lost.83 Berkman's and Gonzales's narratives
were crucial to preserving disparate impact doctrine.
2. National Context
New Haven's virtual exclusion of women, and women of color in
particular, from firefighting jobs was part of a broader national pattern.
The National Report on Women in Firefighting, published in 2008, doc-
umented the long history of exclusion of women from firefighting, the
harassment that they faced doing the job, and the fact that this pattern has
been stubbornly resistant to change. Nationwide, women are about 3.7%
of the number of firefighters, and in a significant number of departments
the number of women is even lower.84 The latter group includes both
New York City and Los Angeles,85 cases that I consider here below as
examples of the intersectional discrimination that remained obscured in
Ricci. Other fire departments, such as Minneapolis, San Francisco, Mi-
ami, and Boulder have significantly higher proportions of women (from
13%-17%) and utilization has been closer to actual availability.86 This





82. Id. at 380-81.
83. Id. at 381.
84. See HULErT ET AL., supra note 62, at 1.
85. See id
86. Id. at 2 (listing several metropolitan areas with impressive percentages of women fire-
fighters: Miami-Dade, FL at 13%; Boulder, CO at 14%; San Francisco, CA at 15%; Madison, WI at
15%; and Minneapolis, MN at 17%).
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demonstrates that the exclusionary patterns present in New Haven were
not unique but nor were they inevitable.
The report also documents that the situation for women of color is
quite acute: While women of color would be expected to be about 5.9%
of the profession, according to the figures drawn from the 2000 census,
they constitute only 0.8% of firefighters.87 That means that they are cur-
rently represented at only 13.6% of the expected numbers while white
women are represented at 26% of the expected rate.8 8 Underrepresenta-
tion of women of color is twice that of white women.89 Notably, women
of color also report in interviews that in addition to facing the stereotype
that women
"are not cut out for firefighting" . . . . [S]ome of their white
women colleagues distance themselves from efforts by men of
color to combat racism and improve departmental practices in
areas such as promotions. These circumstances leave women
of color feeling particularly isolated and inadequately support-
ed by either women's or minority employee organizations.
90
Other sociological studies tend to support the view that the experience of
women of color in firefighting remains highly fraught, as racism and
sexism interact to render them particularly vulnerable to discrimination.
9
1
By their own words, they contend that they are unable to identify wheth-
er a negative action was motivated by their racial identity or by their
gender.92
3. New York and Los Angeles Through an Intersectional Lens: Big
Cities, Big Problems
The hiring and promotional records of fire departments in New
York and Los Angeles illustrate the entrenched nature of the sex- and
race-based exclusion. While both cities are very racially diverse, this is
not reflected in their fire departments. Women of color in particular have
not fared well, and the patterns of intersectional vulnerabilities are quite





91. Janice D. Yoder & Patricia Aniakudo, "Outsider Within" the Firehouse: Subordination
and Difference in the Social Interactions of African American Women Firefighters, II GENDER &
SoC'Y 324, 332 (1997) (describing the difficulties facing Black women who are stereotyped as
angry, aggressive, welfare recipients and "beasts of burden" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Like white women, Black women experienced hazing, close supervision, and frequent punishment;
but unlike white women who are perceived as weak, the stereotype of Black women as beasts of
burden increased expectations about the work they were expected to do. Id.
92. McGinley, supra note 9, at 609 (summarizing findings of the studies that it was impossi-
ble for Black women to assess whether they were being discriminated against on the basis of race or
sex, but clearly experiencing the intersectional impact of both).
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intersectional analysis provides a more accurate and compelling account
of discrimination and is a source of important evidence to support the
continued utility of the disparate impact framework. These cases might
offer important examples of why the missing evidence in Ricci regarding
the impact of New Haven's practices on women and on women of color
in particular was such a costly omission.
a. Los Angeles
While Los Angeles is a majority-minority city-29% of the resi-
dents are white-this diversity is not reflected its fire department
(LAFD).93 Specifically, over 50% of the department is white, 31% is
Latino, 12% is Black, and 7% is Asian-American.94 Even more signifi-
cant is the underutilization of women who comprise only 3% of the uni-
formed ranks, the same as in 1995.95
Actions by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) against the LAFD underscore that the employment record with
regard to women is not a function of women's lack of interest in the job
or natural sorting. In 2007, not long after a thirty-year-old federal con-
sent decree proscribing discrimination against women and minorities had
expired, the EEOC intervened following several high-profile harassment
and retaliation cases.96 One involved a Black male firefighter, Tennie
Pierce, who sued for discrimination and retaliation that included charges
that his coworkers had mixed dog food in with his meal.97 Pierce's set-
tlement for $1.4 million was initially approved by the city council and
was later vetoed by the mayor following media controversy over claims
that Pierce had participated in some hazing.98 In another case, Brenda
Lee, a Black lesbian firefighter, won a $6.2 million dollar award in a jury
trial based on charges of repeated harassment and retaliation.99 The ver-
dict was reversed on appeal on technical grounds and remanded.'00 Lee's
93. Michael Finnegan, Ben Welsh & Robert J. Lopez, New LAFD Recruit Class is Nearly All





96. Kerry Cavanaugh & Beth Barrett, Feds Find Evidence LAFD Violates Rights of its Wom-




99. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC336783, 2007 WL 5506484 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 12,
2007), rev'd, No. B202865, 2010 WL 553022 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010).
100. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, No. B202865, 2010 WL 553022 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18,
2010), rev'g No. BC336783, 2007 WL 5506484 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 12, 2007). The reversal in
Lee's case was primarily based on an asserted failure to exhaust administrative remedies, so that the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider important aspects of her claim. The verdict was significant,
nevertheless. As one commentator noted:
The 2007 jury decision was reportedly the largest in a line of case settlements involving
discrimination and retaliation against minorities and women within the fire department in
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coplaintiffs, white firefighters who charged they were retaliated against
for attempting to assist her, both won significant awards: $1.7 million in
one case and $350,000 in another.'0° The first Black female firefighter
serving in the LAFD, d'Lisa Davies, also recovered $325,000 in a case
involving charges of discrimination over two decades of service.0 2 The
cases revealed ongoing patterns of racial and gender exclusionary con-
duct-conduct that has resulted in over $16 million in verdicts and set-
tlements against the city since 2005.103
Recent events have disclosed that despite the EEOC investigation
and public denunciations of the department's practices by public offi-
cials, the exclusion of women has continued. In January 2014, the first
recruit class of seventy firefighters in five years is over 60% white and
includes only one woman.'°4 The group does include thirteen sons and
three nephews of current firefighters.'0 5 Reports of nepotism, irregular
procedures, and selective disclosure of applications have resulted in a
decision to temporarily suspend additional recruitment. 
06
Los Angeles. The cases have allegedly cost Los Angeles taxpayers more than $15 million
since 2005. In a 2007 letter to the fire department, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission concluded that there had been a pattern of harassment, discrimination and
retaliation against female and black firefighters, where federal civil rights laws had been
violated.
After allegations of sexual and racial discrimination surfaced in the Los Angeles fire de-
partment, former Fire Chief William Bamattre reportedly retired early, in 2007.
California Court Overturns Female Firefighter's Racial, Gender Discrimination Case, HOWARD
LAW, P.C. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.howardlawpc.com/lawyer-attomey-2237175.html.
101. Bill Hetherman, LAFD Firefighter Discrimination Case Winding Down, U-T SAN DIEGO
(July 3, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2007/jul/03/lafd-firefighter-
discrimination-case-winding-down/2/?#article-copy.
102. Michael Finnegan & Ben Welsh, Next L.A. Fire Chief's Other Challenge: Race and Sex
Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/0l/local/la-me-fire-
discrimination-20131202.
103. Cavanaugh & Barrett, supra note 96.
104. Finnegan et al., supra note 93.
105. City News Service, L.A. Fire Department Graduates First Class of Recruits in 5 Years,
but No Women Included, L.A. DAILY NEWS (June 12, 2014, 3:51 PM),
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140612/la-fire-department-graduates-first-class-of-
recruits-in-5-years-but-no-women-included.
106. According to one report, the problems were sufficiently severe that earlier in 2014 the
mayor temporarily suspended the recruitment program:
Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti suspended the city's firefighter recruitment program
Thursday amid concerns about mismanagement and nepotism, including new emails that
show special recruitment workshops were organized for relatives of department insiders.
"I have determined that he Fire Department's recruiting process is fatally flawed," the
mayor said in a statement Thursday.
The action follows a Times report last month that thousands of candidates who passed a
written test were excluded from consideration for a new training class because some of
their paperwork wasn't received in the first 60 seconds of a filing period last spring.
Nearly 25% of the 70 recruits eventually hired were related to LAFD firefighters.
Robert J. Lopez & Ben Welsh, LAFD Recruit Program is Suspended, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2014/mar/20/local/la-me-lafd-20140321.
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b. New York City
New York City's fire department (FDNY) presents one of the most
stark and persistent records of underutilization of women and women of
color in the country. Although the city's overall population is approxi-
mately 30% Latino, 25%-30% Black, 10% Asian, and 51% women,
fewer than 6% of FDNY's 11,000 firefighters are men of color, and
women comprise only 0.3% of the total.0 7 In testimony before the city
Council of New York City, Marc Bendick, the social scientist who was
one of the authors of the national study, pointed out that were women
treated equally as men at FDNY, there would be over 1,800 women ra-
ther than the current number of 100 uniformed personnel (including fire-
fighters and emergency medical technicians).10 8 This record, he opined,
was more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case of gender dis-
crimination against the FDNY. 1°9 For the past six years the city has been
in litigation over its record with regard to race and has recently reached a
settlement. 10
According to the President of the United Women Firefighters,
Sarinya Srisakul, (who is also New York City's first Asian-American
female firefighter) the city's record is a predictable consequence of its
practices of utilizing extra, and arguably illegal, physical tests that make
impose additional requirements even on those candidates who have al-
ready passed the Candidate Physical Ability Test (CPAT)-a test widely
used in departments across the country in physical screening."' She con-
tended, "What is happening is that the Department is forced to use these
entrance standards that promote diversity that they don't agree with, so
they put harder standards in academy to weed them out."" 1 2 This com-
ports with Bendick's testimony that the "outcome [in the FDNY] is di-
rectly traceable to a departmental culture in which hostility, discrimina-
tion, harassment, and exclusion operate."" 
3
What is quite remarkable is that the issues and barriers confronting
women and people of color today so closely mirror the concerns raised
regarding FDNY practices over three decades ago. Berkman's account of
107. Test of Courage: The Making of a Firefighter, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/itvs/testofcourage/diversity3.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
108. Bendick, supra note 68, at 3.
109. Id. at 8.
110. See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013), rev'g 683 F. Supp. 2d
225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'g 637 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. City of New York:
FDNY Employment Discrimination Case, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec topics/fdny/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (discussing the settlement).
The settlement calls for new written exams, eliminating nepotism from the personnel board that has
a role in hires, and addressing pay. Mary Emily O'Hara, Bill De Blasio 's Diversity Opportunity, THE
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/12/bill-de-blasio-s-
diversity-opportunity.html.
11I. O'Hara, supra note 110.
112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Bendick, supra note 68, at 1-2.
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the barriers that were placed in the path of women seeking to enter the
department, and in particular the use of physical screening exams to
weed out candidates, presages, and comports with contemporary allega-
tions.' 14 The fact that the same discredited rationales regarding the suita-
bility of women are in circulation as an explanation for FDNY's record is
quite telling.
Berkman's account also reveals important dimensions of an inter-
sectional framework. While the discourses and logics of race- and sex-
based exclusion are not the same, they are often mobilized in tandem,
and have interactive effects. Berkman's personal narrative reflects a
recognition that a crucial source of support for her throughout her long
ordeal with the FDNY was the Organization of Black Firefighters."5
As this Part demonstrates, the stories of women and of women of
color in particular have been an important part of challenging the exclu-
sionary practices of fire departments across the nation. The fact that they
were omitted from the discussion in Ricci represented a failure to consid-
er the insights offered by an intersectional analysis. This next Part con-
114. Berkman testified before the House Committee on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 regarding
the reason that Wards Cove needed to be corrected, stating:
I took the written test in December of 1977, with 409 other women and over 24,000
men. Almost all of us passed the written test. Although 389 women passed the written
test, only 88 took the physical test because it was rumored that no woman could pass it.
We were required to complete seven tests: a dummy carry, a hand grip, a broad jump, a
flexed-arm hang, an agility test, a ledge walk, and a one-mile run. The rumor turned out
to be accurate: although 7,847 men passed the physical exam, not a single woman passed
it.
I decided to challenge the test because I did not believe that it tested fairly for the skills
needed to be an effective firefighter. The trial court found that the test had a disparate
impact on women. The judge also held that the City failed to prove business necessity,
because the abilities tested by the physical exam were not predictive ofjob performance.
The judge also found that carrying a dummy with no arms or legs was more difficult
than carrying a real person. I was unable to carry the 120-lb. dummy, as were 76 of the
80 women who tried, but at trial I carried my 180-lb. counsel across the courtroom to
show the judge I could carry a live person.
The judge invalidated the physical tests as a violation of Title VII.
... I was ultimately hired in 1982, with 41 other women.
... Once hired, we were denied the ordinary amenities of cooperative firehouse living
and subjected to daily sexual harassment and hazing. This included crude sexual com-
ments, obscene graffiti and physical molestation.
After one year I was terminated, along with Zeda Gonzales, another female firefighter.
We challenged the terminations in court, and the judge held that we had been discharged
in retaliation for playing a prominent role in the lawsuit.
I am here today to express my strong support for the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 1 do not
believe I would have won my case under the principles set forth in Wards Cove ....
If Wards Cove had been decided in 1979, rather than 1989, New York City would proba-
bly still not have a single woman firefighter.
Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 30, at 380-81 (statement of Brenda Berkman, President,
United Women Firefighters).
115. Event, Taking the Heat, supra note 69, at 723 (calling the Black firefighters organization
the "biggest single [source of] support").
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siders the seeming hypervisibility of race and gender in the context of
Justice Sotomayor's nomination and the simultaneous masking of racial-
ist and gendered frames and presumptions. The Ricci case figured prom-
inently in this discourse.
II. RICCI, RACE, AND GENDER IN THE SOTOMAYOR NOMINATION
It was very hot in Washington, D.C. during the summer of 2010, but
not just because of the temperature outdoors. The Judiciary Committee
was conducting what had become highly contentious hearings on the
nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court.1 6 Initially,
it did not appear that Sotomayor's candidacy would cause significant
controversy. As Obama's first nominee to the Court, 117 he touted her
"depth of experience" and "breadth of perspective,"'1' 8 implying that the-
se virtues would imbue her with empathy-a quality he had previously
extolled.'19 Implicit, if not explicit, in the initial reactions was a positive
response to the fact that she was the first Supreme Court nominee from
the Latino community.12° That community embraced her as a symbol of
rising political influence notwithstanding her gender identity.12' This
seemed to mark some distance from the representational politics that
rendered Black women less visible and less able than Black men to em-
body antiracist aspirations and be the standard bearers of racial justice.
22
Thus, to the extent that Sotomayor's nomination was celebrated in the
Latino community as representative of racial progress, the story seemed
116. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 11 th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
II 1 shrg56940/html/CHRG- I Ishrg56940.htm.




118. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia
Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating-Judge-
Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court.
119. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Justice David Souter (May
1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-justice-david-
souter ("I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people's hopes and
struggles as an essential ingredient for arriving as just decisions and outcomes.").
120. See Baker & Zeleny, supra note 117.
121. Tricia Bishop, A Cause for Celebration: Sotomayor Nomination to High Court Raises
Latino Pride, BALT. SUN, June 29, 2009, at 4A; Joye Brown, Calls of Praise for Sotomayor,
NEWSDAY, July 15, 2009, at A28; Bart Jones, Local Latino Leaders Herald High Court Pick,
NEWSDAY, May 27, 2009, at A05; Kent A. Miles, Local Support for Sotomayor, ATL. J. & CONST.,
May 27, 2009, at A12; Victor Manuel Ramos, Sotomayor's Nomination is Source of Pride for His-
panics in Central Florida, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 2009, at Al 0; Ted Roelofs, 'I am Very
Proud' Hispanic Residents of West Michigan Closely Watch Confirmation Hearings, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, July 14, 2009, at Al.
122. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Thomas nomination to the
Supreme Court and the fact that Black women were not able to represent the race, while he was able
to gamer support by asserting that the hearings were a "hi-tech lynching").
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to offer a hopeful counterpoint to the problem Crenshaw so powerfully
identified with reference to the issue of Black women and antiracism.123
Yet, the initial celebratory atmosphere proved to be short-lived.
Two lines of attack emerged, in some ways complementing and under-
writing the same message. First, Sotomayor's identity as a Latina that
had been mobilized as a symbol of advancing racial equality became the
mark of bias.124 In a sense, her intersectional identity as a woman of col-
or became an albatross and rendered her hypervisible. Second, the Su-
preme Court's decision reversing her opinion in Ricci became evidence
of her alleged racial loyalty and impeached her assertion of impartiality.
Had she been white and ruled in Ricci's favor, her objectivity likely
would not have been questioned, as her decision would not have disrupt-
ed prevailing expectations. These critiques problematically relied on the
presumptions that her identity as a woman of color made her less likely
to be fair in contrast to whites whose racial identity is affiliated with neu-
trality and objectivity.
This Part considers how Ricci functioned to construct Sotomayor's
identity as a woman of color who was presumptively biased and a "re-
verse racist." Even though Sotomayor ultimately was confirmed by the
Senate, the constraints imposed by the underlying racial presumptions
reproduced an alignment between racial minority affiliations and anti-
white bias. This reinforced arguments subsequently deployed in other
presidential appointment hearings.'25 Of course, the opposition to Presi-
dent Obama's nominees was never short of reasons to support its posi-
tion. However, this particular narrative had great utility in connection
with President Obama's judicial and cabinet appointments. In this sense,
Sotomayor's confirmation is less an illustration of majoritarian power
and is more demonstrative of the imperatives of colorblindness as a legit-
imate litmus test of objectivity and judicial temperament and a presumed
characteristic of whites. Utilizing the tools of intersectional analysis
would have challenged these assumptions. This was crucial in resetting
the terms of engagement around not only Sotomayor's appointment but
in securing political space for future nominees of color.
A. Ricci as Evidence of Sotomayor's Alleged Bias
New Haven had also been sued by the Firebirds several times, a mi-
nority firefighter's organization, over its promotional practices and so it
knew that it faced serious consequences if it failed to have a fair selec-
tion process.126 Accordingly, once it was clear that the city's test and its
123. See discussion, supra Part IA.
124. Peter Wallsten, More in GOP Make Race Focus of Sotomayor Nomination: They Allege
She Wouldn't Be Fair to White Men, BOS. GLOBE, June 1, 2009, at 6.
125. See infra note 142.
126. See generally Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. Of Fire Comm'rs, 66
F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
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method of scoring the exam produced hugely racially disparate results-
virtually no Black or Latino would be promoted-the city cancelled the
test results out of concern regarding disparate impact liability., 27 It was
also particularly concerned that it could not demonstrate that less dis-
criminatory alternatives were unavailable.28 Nevertheless, the Ricci
plaintiffs, all white and one Latino, challenged the city's action as unlaw-
ful disparate treatment discrimination. Their theory was that the city's
cancellation of the test amounted to discriminating against white candi-
dates on the basis of race.129 Arguably, this was a novel interpretation of
Title VII-essentially claiming that taking account of the results of the
test by race constituted an illegitimate racial motive.'30 Sotomayor served
on the panel in the Second Circuit that ruled in favor of the city.'
31
Once the Supreme Court reversed that ruling and found for the Ricci
plaintiffs, Sotomayor's ruling was challenged as evidence that her identi-
ty-as a Latina-trumped her willingness to adhere to the law. 132 She
was simply engaged in racial self-aggrandizement. This argument ig-
nored the fact that the Ricci decision reshaped existing doctrine: So-
tomayor's opinion followed what had been the prevailing consensus
about the law before the Supreme Court's decision in Ricci.'33 One can
dispute whether that consensus was correct, but Sotomayor's decision
was grounded in a reasonable reading of the doctrine.'
34
127. A.G. Sulzberger, Bias Suit a Test of Resolve for Hispanic Man, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/nyregion/03firefighter.html.
128. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009).
129. Id. at 563.
130. See id.
131. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd 557 U.S. 557
(2009).
132. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, The Limits of Empathy for Sonia Sotomayor, TIME, June
8, 2009, at 32 (describing Sotomayor's decision in the Ricci case as a defense of "racial prefer-
ences"); David Paul Kuhn, Left Dodges Moral Debate on Ricci Case, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (June
30, 2009),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/30/left dodges moral debate on ricci case.htm]
(describing the dissenting opinion in Ricci as "uph[olding] the city's effort to find any means to hold
fast to conventional affirmative action").
133. Paul Bass, Firebirds, NAACP: Ricci Won't Stop Us, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 30, 2009,
5:03 PM), http://newhavenindependent.org/archives/2009/06/thesupreme cou 1.php.
134. See 'Hardball with Chris Matthews' for Monday, July 13, NBCNEwS,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31905856/ns/msnbc-tv-hardball-with-chris-matthews (last updated
July 14, 2009) (quoting Senator Durbin's response to a question Chris Matthews posed regarding
Senator Durbin's opinion of Justice Sotomayor's decision in Ricci: "I think her ruling was the only
ruling that she could have handed down. It reflected 38 years of court decisions. It reflected the trial
court's decision, the appellate panel's decision, and the full appellate court, and she joined in to what
was clearly the precedent. Along came the Supreme Court, and by a 5 to 4 vote, a very close vote,
turned it over and said, We're going to do it differently. How can you hold that against her? I mean,
she was really taking the law as given to her over the years and applying the law to the set of facts
she was given"); Wade Henderson Testifies at Sonia Sotomayor's Confirmation Hearings, WASH.
POST (July 16, 2009 4:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071603085.html ("Judge Sotomayor has participated in
thousands of cases and authored hundreds of opinions, but much of the debate about her nomination
has concentrated on the difficult case of Ricci v. DeStefano. Whatever one may feel about the facts
of this case, we all agree that the Supreme Court, in its Ricci decision, set a new standard for inter-
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Ricci himself was a central witness called before the Judiciary
Committee to testify against Sotomayor's nomination.135 His story of
prevailing over adversity and achieving according to merit-based stand-
ards was largely uncontested. No Black male or female firefighter of any
race testified before the Senate about the egregious and ongoing patterns
of discrimination that had kept New Haven's Fire Department, and its
supervisory structure, predominately white and overwhelmingly male.
This systemic privilege was invisible, outside the purview of commen-
tary.
Moreover, it is also important to note the asymmetrical nature of the
significance ascribed to racial and gender identity. Ricci's racial identity
and that of the Justices in the majority, did not perform similar delegiti-
mizing work nor call into question particular judgments or claims. Put
differently, Ricci's identity as a white male, a class that had historically
and continually benefited from the existing distribution of power and
resources, did not undermine the perceived legitimacy of his arguments.
In contrast, Sotomayor's identity was not only grounds for suspi-
cion: A second line of attack opened up based on the now infamous
comment in which she invoked her own identity at the intersection of
race and gender. In comments in a 2002 keynote speech given to a con-
ference organized by Latino Students on Latinos and Latinas in the judi-
ciary, she stated, "I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the rich-
ness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclu-
sion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."' 3 6 As the crescendo of
criticism swelled, President Obama walked it back for her stating, "I'm
sure she would have restated it."'' 37 Thus, the very life experience
fighting prejudice and discrimination as a Latina that shapes, influences,
and affects viewpoint-experience that conservatives like Clarence
Thomas have repeatedly invoked'38-became something to be disa-
vowed.
preting Title V11 of the '64 Civil Rights Act. Using this one decision to negate Judge Sotomayor's 17
years on the bench does a disservice to her record and to this country."); see also Hayden v. County
of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1998))
(holding that reducing adverse impact on minorities does not equate to reverse discrimination against
whites, stating that "the intent to remedy the disparate impact of the prior exams is not equivalent to
an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants"); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at
82 (noting that "Prior to Ricci, the Court had never held that an employer risks Title VII disparate
treatment liability for failing to use an employment test hat produces racially adverse impact").
135. See Continuation of the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 111 th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/continuation-of-the-nomination-of-sonia-
sotomayor-to-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states-2009-07-16.
136. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002).
137. Obama Calls Criticism of Sotomayor 'Nonsense,' NBC NEWS (May 29, 2009, 6:43 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31004091/ns/politics-white-house/t/obama-calls-criticism-sotomayor-
nonsense/#.U UMY IdXT8.
138. In his autobiography, My Grandfather's Son, Thomas relates his experience as a poor
Black child in a culturally distinct African-American community in rural Georgia who grew up
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B. Ricci's Lingering Effects
Even though these attacks had no impact on Justice Sotomayor's ac-
tual confirmation, they arguably served to undermine the nominee in the
eyes of the broader public. The terms upon which her nomination was
challenged, as Kevin Johnson pointed out, were deeply infected by race
and gender stereotypes about Latinas: She was deemed to lack judicial
temperament.139 Other opponents in Congress asserted that she had "lots
of 'splaining to do," invoking an imagined accent and phrase drawn from
Ricky Ricardo's character on I Love Lucy.'40
Sotomayor's confirmation required her to perform and completely
disavow any meaningful connection with antiracist organizations or
causes. Her affiliations were demonized. The National Council of La
Raza and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund were both called racist
organizations; the National Council of La Raza was called the Latino
equivalent of the KKK. 141 Certainly, while this tactic was not new, the
debate intensified and affirmed those dynamics.
These dynamics and constraints have extended beyond the Justice's
nomination. The relentless political opposition to President Obama has
affected his ability to appoint various officers and cabinet positions, in
part by narrowing the political space in which civil rights advocacy has
operated. 142 At times, as in the case of Justice Sotomayor, even moderate
under segregation and racial subordination. See generally CLARENCE THOMAS, My GRANDFATHER'S
SON 1-28 (2007). Thus, while Thomas is a vocal conservative who endorses colorblindness, he does
so from a racially specific position that draws on what he sees as the lessons from this history about
overcoming racial obstacles. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Prefer-
ences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1174-76 (2008).
139. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First Latina
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. The 'High-Tech Lynching' of a 'Wise Latina'? 20-21, 43-49,
(UC Davis Legal Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 188, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1460932.
140. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Neil A. Lewis, Queries on Abortion and Guns Fail to Break
Judge's Stride, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/us/politics/I 6confirm.html (internal quotation mark omitted).
141. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 139, at 45; Susan Crile, Tancredo Claims Sotomayor in
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candidates are opposed as radical extremists. These constraints stand
against the backdrop of a federal judiciary that over the past several dec-
ades has plainly been reshaped in accordance with conservative political
preferences.143 Yet any arguments on behalf of appointments of more
centrist or liberal judges are denounced as efforts to politicize the
courts.44 Certainly, the recent decision to move away from the require-
ment of a supermajority to confirm judicial nominees is a positive
sign,145 but the terms of the debate are still framed by a narrative that
erases the political advocacy and conservative racial preferences that
installed the current bench.
In response, the Obama administration's approach to judicial nomi-
nees has been shaped by conservative resistance: The strategy is to nom-
inate only those persons who will not engender resistance.46 Note that
affiliation with, or even leadership in, the Federalist Society should ap-
parently engender no concerns about ideological orientation or commit-
ments. 147
The framing of Sotomayor as anti-white reinforces the view of the
status quo as race neutral and affirms whiteness as a legitimate baseline.
Bias is defined as seeing race as relevant. Thus what might be thought of
as race attentiveness per se-simply noticing race-is a form of racial
discrimination against whites. This was the Court's position in Ricci. The
distorted debate over the Sotomayor nomination reproduced that same
logic.
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CONCLUSION
The Ricci case, while ostensibly a case about race alone was in fact
a case about multiple mechanisms of exclusion. Indeed, understanding
the way that racial privilege had been constructed and configured in the
New Haven Fire Department required an examination of its gendered
dimensions. The lack of any intersectional perspective that illuminated
these connections deprived those who opposed Frank Ricci's simple sto-
ry of hard work, and colorblind merit of important evidence to challenge
that presupposition. In that sense, while Ricci might nevertheless have
been decided in the same way, the important work of resetting the racial
narrative is performed not only through the actual decision in the case
but in the framing of the debate. In that sense, an analysis of the experi-
ence of women of color as part of and representative of the excluded
class of women offered critical insights into important connections.
While the invisibility of gender was a feature of the debate over the
Ricci case, the hypervisibility of race and gender marked the nomination
and confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Ricci here played a role in helping organize the narrative that she was
biased and, therefore, could not fulfill her duties to remain neutral and
objective like her white counterparts. The rapid mobilization of these
readily available stereotypes illustrates not only the particular vulnerabil-
ity of women of color to bias, but further illuminates one of the central
mechanisms of structural inequality, which is to treat the racially unequal
status quo as neutral and fair. Intersectional analysis in both domains can
yield greater insight hat is valuable in its own right and indispensable in
the context of antiracist and feminist politics, as it can enable greater and
broader coalitional work and additionally, better articulate the operation
of and interrelationship between race and gender subordination.
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